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T::e broad underlying principle follow -d "by the courts
in construing the utate constitutions is that such instruments
are limitations upon legislative power. In other words the
people speaking through the organic law have granted to leg-
islative bodies the power to enact laws in all cases which
have not otherwise been specifically provided for by the lan-
guage of the constitution. In general the legislature has
power to paso laws on all political and governmental matters
except those over which the executive and judicial departments
have been granted control by constitutional authority, and
except in those cases where legislation has been expressly
for-&idden or where legislation would violate some right
;
which by custom and immemorial usage has remained inherent in
the people.
Because the theory of the supremacy of the English Par-
liament found foothold in this country, our legislative bodies
were primarily supreme also. Before the decision in Marbury v.
Madison ( 1. ) it was an open question whether or not the Sup-
reme Court of the United States could declare a legislative
act void, for the Constitution did not specifically grant the
Court any such power. Furthermore the powers vested in Congress
as well as those vested in the Executive Department were theo-
retically co-ordinate and not inferior to the powers vested in
the Courts. The legislative body by the very fact that they
1. 1 Cranch 137

passed an act raised the presumption that they, who were in
the best position to examine and judge the facts requiring
a certain legislative remedy, had found such an act necessary
and not in violation of any of the provisions in the document
they had all sworn in their oath of office to uphold and pro-
tect. However, the Court, in Marbury v. Madison established
the principle that public policy demanded^and the framers of
the Constitution intended that the courts were to be the final
arbiters as to whether or not an act was in violation of the
Constitution.
Owing to this earlier conception of the supremacy of leg-
islative power, colonial charters and the earlier state Con-
stitutions contained few limitations upon their legislatures.
The relation between these legislative bodies and the people
they represented was very close ,and persons desiring some priv-
ilege, usually one connected with corporate enterprise, sec-
ured this privilege by a special act of the legislature. These
acts were necessarily local and special in their nature^yet
in that period of our constitutional development such grants
o^ privilege were not ordinarily considered vicious or dan-
gerous. However, with national industrial growth and the con-
centration of the population in large cities, the great dif-
ferentiation in the local needs of municipal corporations , and
the desire for economice betterment on the part of enterprising
individuals soon made the defective features of local and

special legislation apparent.
"What may be called the science of legislation - the care-
ful adaptation of laws both to the needs of the state and the
various classes of people composing it, and to the body of
law already in existence, the determination of the proper
scope of general laws, and of the circumstances which call for
legislation of a local or special character was too little
regarded, and as time went on, not only was the volume of
special and local legislation needlessly increased, such acts
being frequently passed as to matters that could have been
provided for under a general system, but private schemes were
often pushed through the legislatures by unscrupulous men, to
the sacrifice of public interests, each separate locality
was liable to unwise interference in its affairs, and dis-
tracting changes of its governmental system, and the law as
to many matters was thrown into confusion." (1.)
Because of the obvious inadequacy of granting privileges
by special act of the legislature ^by the beginning of the
fifties a certain well defined constitutional provision, entire-
ly devoted to the enumeration of certain cases in which the
legislature was prohibited from passing any local or special
laws, had appeared. Of the state Constitutions now in force
that of Hew Jersey in 1844 was the first to provide such a
section. (2.) In this instrument there are ten specific cases
in which special and local legislation is prohibited^ Some of
1. Binney- "Restrictions Upon Local and Special Legislation.
"
2. Art. IV - Sec. VII - 1,2, 7, 11.

the prohibitions are; the granting of divorces; laying out
highways; selecting juries; regulating the internal affairs
of towns and counties; increasing the fees of any public officer;
changing the law of descent; ana granting exclusive privileges
to corporations.
The Supreme Court of Indiana speaking of a similar pro-
vision adopted by that State in 18 51 said that the object of
this provision "was to restore the state from being a coterie
of small independencies, with a body of local laws like so
many counties palatine, to what she should be and 7/as intended
to be, a unity, governed throughout her borders on all subjects
of common interest by the same laws, general and uniform in
their operation." ( 1.)
In the debates of the Kentucky Constitutional Convention
of 1890, Mr. Carroll spoke in favor of the adoption of a sim-
ilar section for that state.
"It is a well known fact," he said, "that one of the prime
causes for the calling of this convention was the abuses prac-
riced by the Legislative Department of this State; and I ven-
ture the assertion that except for the vicious legislation and
the local and special laws of all kinds and character passed
by the legislatures that have met in Kentucky for the past
twenty years, that no proposition to call a Constitutional
Convention could ever have received a majority of the votes
of the people of Kentucky". (2)
1. Maize v. state - 4 md. 342
2. Kentucky Const. Con. Debates 1890 1-1419.
As quoted in Beard - "Readings on American Government
.^a

LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION IK PASSING SPECIAL LAWS WHERE GENERAL
LAWS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE APPLICABLE.
Now practically every state in the Union has a section of
specific prohibitions against special and local legislation. (X)
All of the states except five
t
having a section of specific
prohibitions, have also a concluding clause which provides in
effect that the legislature shall in all other cases pass no
special or local law where a general law can be made applicable.
(
%
The language of this concluding prohibition may at first blush
appear perfectly clear. However, the question arises, "Who is
to determine whether or not a special or local law was nec-
essary and that a general law could not have been made ap-
plicable in a given case? of course in case the legislature
passes an act which is special or local and violates some
specific prohibition in the constitution the courts will hold
such act void. ( S. ) Bur '"hen a special act is passed that is
not contrary to any one of the specific prohibitions may the
courts step in and say. that a general law could have been
made applicable to this situation
;
and by such a decision sub-
stitute their discretion for that of the legislature, or does
the language of the provision mean that the question as to
whether or not a general law could have been made applicable,
l^ave-thio question to the discretion and judgment of the
legislature alone?
This question oi who shall A whether or not a special law
was necessary in a given case and that a general law could not
have been made applicable does not arise in some states for
the reason that this concluding clause provides in effect that
the legislature shall pass general laws in the enumerated
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In Oregon, Washington, Pennsylvania, Idaho and North
Carolina there are no provisions requiring that "in all other
cases v.here a general lav; can be made applicable no special
act shall "be passed". In a few other states there is some
differentiation in this provision which has been or will be
indicated elsev/here.
(3.)
Knopf v. People, 185 111. 20
State v. DesMoines 96 Iowa 521.
State v. County Court 50 Mo. 350.
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cases and in all other cases which in its judgment may be pro-
vided for by general laws. (1) This phraseology makes it ab-
solutely clear that if the legislature passes a special or
local law where a general law might have been made applicable,
the veiy passage of the act in question is conclusive proof
that in its judgment the legislature thought a general act
could not be made applicable, and the constitution makes the
judgment of the legislature final. The Mississippi provision
is unique in the forcible language used to leave no doubt that
the question is conclusively for the legislature to determine.
It provides "that in all other cases where a general law can
be made applicable and would be advantageous, no special law
shall be enacted" and that, "If a bill is passed in conformity
to the requirements hereof, other than such as are prohibited
in the next section ( the specific prohibitions ) the courts
shall not, because of its local, special or private character
refuse to enforce it." (2)
So where the language of the Constitution has expressly
left the question of the applicability of a general law to
legislative judgment no difficulty has arisen. In the other
states, however, the doubt created by the phraseology of the
provision has given rise to some conflict of authority in its
interpretation. The weight of authority has been to construe
this section as though it specifically made it a question of
1. New Jersey 1844, IV-VII -11. Va. 1902 IV- 64.
New York 1894, III - 18. Miss. 1890, IV - 87
<? Miss. isQn
f
tv - ay
.

legislative judgment to decide whether a general law could have
been made applicable to the case for which the special act
was passed, and that the determination of the legislature that
a special or local statute was necessary is final and conclus-
ive, since the clause does not provide for a judicial review
of legislative discretion, it is usually held that the courts
can not declare the act of a co-ordinate branch of the gov-
ernment void, purely because the court may think that a gen^
eral law could have been made applicable and that a special
act was not necessary to accomplish the purpose of the legis-
lature.
In one of the earliest cases involving this point the
Supreme Court of Kansas said: "We imagine this section of the
Constitution as leaving a discretion to the Legislature
.
The Legislature must necessarily determine whether their pur-
pose can or can not be expediently accomplished by a general
law. Their discretion and sense of duty are the chief if not
the only securities of the public for an intelligent compliance
with that section of the Constitution." (1.)
This view has subsequently been taken by other states
where this provision is found in their constitutions. The
Illinois Supreme Court has said: "The general clause at the
end of the section that 'where a general law can be made ap-
plicable no special law shall be enacted', addresses itself to
the General Assembly alone. When that body has concluded a
special law is necessary, except in the cases expressly pro-
1. State v. Hitchcock
, 18S£- 1 Kan. 178.

NOTE:-
The Courts have held the applicability of a gpaeral law
and the necessity for a special law a legislative question in
the following cases
Boyd v. Bryant 35 Ark . 69
Little Rock v. Parish 36" 166
Brown v. Denver 7 Colo. 305.
Darrow v. People 8 Colo. 426
Bell v. Maish 137 Ind 226
Mc Clelland v. state 142 Ind. 428
Francis v. Atchison & Topeka R.R. 19 Kan. 303
V/itchita v. Burleigh 36 Kan. 34
Davis v. Gaines 48 Ark. 370
Carson v. st. Francis Levve Dist. 59 Ark. 513
Owners of Land v. People 113 III. 296
Wilson v. Board of Trustees 133 111. 443
Gentile v. state 29 Ind. 409
State v. Tucker 46 Ind 355
Vickery v. Chase 50 Ind. 461
Evansville v. state lis Ind. 426
State v. Kolsem 130 Ind. 434
Oklahoma City v. Shields 100 Pac. 576
Smith v. Grayson County 44 S.\'\ 921 (Tex)
Leedy v. Brown 27 Okla. 439

hibited, its conclusion is not the subject of judicial review. "(1.
Although by weight of authority the applicability of a gen-
eral law is a legislative question, there is an exceedingly
strong presumption that in Indiana, which was the first state
to adopt this clause, toct the frarners or the Constitution
intended that the courts should have the power of reviewing
legislative action in cases where a general law might have
been made applicable. Indiana adopted this provision in 1851
and it seems to be based upon the New Jersey provision of 1844 #
aad in substance Ais identical with the provision of that stake
with the important exception that the phrase "in the judgment
of the legislature" does not appear in the Indiana provision.
The very omission of this phrase on the part of the frarners of
the Indiana Constitution raises a strong implication that the
Convention hoped and intended that the courts should construe
this clause as giving them power to review legislative dis-
cretion in such cases.
Furthermore the earlier ^cases held that "The maxim 'that
parliament is omnipotent 1 has no place in American jurispud-
ence. Y/hether the legislature has, in the case at bar, acted
within the scope of their authority, is in our opinion, a prop-
er subject of judicial inquiry." (1.) In fact not until 1891
did it become sttled that the judgment of the legislature was
1. Thomas v. Board of Comrs. Clay County 5 Ind. 4.
Also:M. & I. r.r. v. V/hiteneck 8 Ind. 219, 229.
Jasper County v. Spitler 13 Ind 238.
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conclusive in cases o£ special and local legislation where a
general law might have been made applicable, (l.)
Thfcugh by weight of authority it is held that the judg-
ment or the legislature that a general law would not be applic-
able is final and conclusive, in a few states the law on this
point is in a somewhat unsettled condition. In California the
Court by way of dictum has said that "the Constitution submits
the question whether a general law can be made applicable in
any given case to the judgment of the legislature to be deter-
mined in the light of the evils to be avoided, and with its
determination upon that question we may not interfere unless
the disregard of the Constitutional requirement is clear and
palpable." ( 2.) "Y/e would not overthrow an act of a co-ordin-
ate branch of the government under this provision unless it
clearly app ears that a general law could be made applicable. »( 3
)
As early as 1871 the Nevada Court similarly said:
"Primarily the legislature must decide whether or not in a
given case a general law can be made applicable. That decision
i;:ay be reviewed and upheld or reversed by the Courts, but pre-
sumptively the decision of the legislature is correct . "For this
Court to oppose its judgment to that of the legislature, ex-
cepting in a case admitting of no reasonable doubt, would not
only be contrary to all well considered precedents, but would
be a usurpation of legislative functions. It can not be denied
(jjstate ex. rel. v. Kolsem 130 Ind. 434.
2. People v. Mullender 132 Cal. 217.
3. People v. Levee District No. 6. 131 Cal. 30.
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that the tendency in some states of this Union is that way,
undoubtedly from good motives; but the sooner the people
learn that every act of the legislature not found to be in
clear, palpable and direct conflict with the written constitut-
ion must be sustained by the courts, the sooner they will
apply the proper correction to unjust or impolitic legis-
lation, in the more careful selection of the members of that
branch of the state government to which they have delegated
and in which they have vested the legislative authority of
this state." ( 1. )
Although the California and Nevada Courts have not held
any legislation void as being^special or local lav; where a
general law; might be made applicable, nevertheless they have
stated that they do not consider the discretion of the legis-
lature conclusive and binding upon this point. It would appear
from the dicta of these courts that they wish to reserve the
right of declaring some act special or local where a general
law might be made applicable in order to meet some emergency
that might arise.
In a rather curious way, the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
though not
.
perhaps,
r nether a legislative determination that
a general law could not be made applicable was final or not,
has held an act prohibiting barbers from doing business on
Sunday, void as a special law where a general law could have
1. Hess v. Pegg, 1871. 7 Nev. 23. - Also State v. Clark 8 Nev 323
Evans v. Job 8 Nev. 323; Rosenstock v. Swift 11 Nev. 129
—
__j^jgj^_^_Sfto3nider ( Nev. 1911 ) 115 Pac. 177
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"been made applicable. ( 1. ) The Court in this case closely
followedh decision made to the same effect in Missouri in
regard to a similar statute. The Kentucky Court did not observe
that in Missouri the Constitution specifically provides that
the Courts and not the legislature shall be the judges as to
whether or not a general law could have been made applicable,
while the Kentucky Constitution does not state who shall fin-
ally determine this question. If the act in question was really
a special law within the scope of the evils which such sections
prohibiting local and special legislation intended to prevent,
the Kentucky Court might have properly followed the weight of
authority in determining this question. (2.)
Until a recent case ( 1907 ) the South Carolina Courts
have held that whether or not a general law could have been
made applicable to the situation for which the legislature
deemed a special act necessary was a judicial question. "There
is much authority, » the Court has said, "for the view that
under the provision prohibiting the legislature from passing a
special lav/ where a general law could have been made applicable,
it belongs to the legislature and not the judicial department
to determine whether a general law can be made applicable. V.'e
incline, however, to the view that in this state it must be
held a judicial question to determine when a general law can
be made applicable, since under Art.l - 29 of the Constitution,
l.Stratman v. C'mth. 125 S.W, 1094.
Missouri case followed:- state v. G-ranemann 132 Mo. 326.
Missouri Povision:- const. 1875, VI - 27.

1!,
it la ordained that the provision of the Constitution shall be.
construed to be mandatory and prohibitory and not merely dir-
ectory or permissory by its own terms. 1 ' ( 1.)
A recent case held that the question of finally determin-
ing the necessity for a special law where a general one might
have been made applicable was exclusively for the legislature,
but though this decision was over-ruled in 1910, the lav; is
perhaps somewhat unsettled. (2.) At any rate even though the
Constitution of South Carolina does provide that the provisions
of that instrument shall be mandatory, it is not quite clear
why, that in a case where there may well be a reasonable dif-
ference of opinion, the mandatory clause will give the courts
power to say that a general law could have been made applicable^ 3
)
1. Carolina Grocery Co. v. Burnet ( 1901) 61 S.C. 205.
Followed:- state v. Brock 66 S.C. 357; Burnet v. Israel 61 S.C 215
Cm'r. v. Buckley 82 S.C. 357
2. Buist v. City Council 77 S.C. 275 ( 1907 ). In this case-
Opinion by Gary, J. - it was held that the question was for the
legislature exclusively, Jones, C.J. dissenting.
In Barfield v. Stevens Mercantile Co. 67 S.E. 158.-1910-
opinion by Jones, C.J. - it was held that the question was
judicial^following fomer decisions. Gary, J. dissenting. Per-
haps with a slight change in the personal of the Court, the
law might become definitely settled.
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FOOT-NOTE - 5-
lOPth Dakota, 1-21, California, 1-22, Washington, 1-29,
Montana, 111-29, Utah 1-26, south Carolina 1-29, have man-
datory clause? requiring that the provisions of the Constitu-
tion shall be construed to be mandatory and not merely direct-
ory, unless so otherwise provided. None of these states, except
South Carolina, have gone far enough to indicate that this
clause either specifically or impliedly grants to the courts
the power to review a legislative decision that a general lav/
could not have been made applicable and a special act was
necessary. It is ordinarily a well settled rule of Constitution-
al lav; that the provisions of a constitution are to be taken
as mandatory unless it expressly appears, or is necessarily
implied from the instrument, that some provision is merely in-
tended to be directory. In State ex. rel. Reed v. Jones 6
Wash. 452, it was held that although the mandatory clause is
addressed to the several to the several departments, one
department can not coerce another into obedience to the
mandatory provision.
While the California Court has never gone so far as to
declare a lav; special and that a general lav/ would be applicable
the Court has frequently intimated that there are cases v/here
the court might step in and interfere. Whether this attitude
is because of the mandatory clause it is impossible to say.
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LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION AS TO BUFFICIEHCY OP NOTICE OF INTENTION
TO APPLY FOR LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION.
A discussion of the various provisions prohibiting special
legislation and^what power of review the courts have under such
sections necessarily raises the question of what construction
the courts put upon a provision requiring that no special law
shall be passea unless ;. notice of intention to apply for such
legislation shall have been published in the locality to be
affected a certain length of time before the passage of the
proposed measure. In other words if the legislature finds that
a special act is desir^able, which is not prohibited in the
section of ennumerated cases, such act can not be passed until
notice of intention to apply therefor shall have been published
beforehand. This provision requiring notice only applies to
unnenumerated cases for in the specific cases a special law
can not be passed under any circumstances, and be given the
effect of lav;.
In those states which have this provision requiring notice (1.
the question arises who is to determine finally whether such
notice is sufficient- the legislature of the courts?. By weight
of authority, whether or not proof of publication of notice has
been properly established in the legislature befofe the passage
of the special act is conclusively a question for the legis-
lature. The very passage of a local or special act by that
body is accepted as final evidence that the constitutional
requirements have been complied with.
1. New Jersey 1844, VI - VII-9; Ala. 1901, IV-106; Mo. 1875, IV-54
N. Car.^L87gJLjI--l2; Ark. 1874, V-£6; Fla. 188 5 , 111-21. I
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In regard to this point the Supreme Court of Florida has
said: "The obligation resting upon the legislu | ive department
c
or the government to conform to the requirements of tins pro-
vision of the Constitution, and to the staute lav; enforcing
the same, can not be questioned. No local or special "bill,
Within the purview of the proviso of this section of the or-
ganic lav; should be passed, except and until notice of the in-
tention to apply for the passage of the same has been given in
the manner contemplated by the Constitution, and authorized
legislation thereunder; not is it even presumed that any
branch of the legislative department will give its sanction to
any such local or special legislation until legal and satis-
factory evidence that such notice has been published shall be
•established in the Legislature". This feature of the fund-
amental law is as binding upon the consciences of those in-
trusted with the legislative function of the government as ia
any othef part of the Constitution, but this truth is by no
means conclusive that power has been given to the judiciary
to sit in judgment upon a co-ordinate branch of the govern-
ment. Ho such power has been given to the judiciary. To decide
whether or not the notice has been given is a legislative
function, not only in its nature, but as a result of the pro-
vision that 'the evidence that such notice has been published
shall be established in the legislature before such bill shall
be passed. ' which provision as excluding any interference in
the matter by the judiciary, supplements the inhibition pro-
nounced by the secod article of the Constitution, that no

10
person properly belonging to one of the departments of the
government shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of
the others except in cases expressly provided for by that
instrument '»
. ( 1. )
In Pennsylvania the discretion of the legislature in de-
ciding whether or not the constitutional provision requiring
notice of intention to apply for a special iav;A is not always
conclusive because of the mere passage of the act in question.
In Perkins v. Philadelphia (2.) it was stated that if the law
had been properly certified by the General Assembly and approved
by the Governor, the presumption that the proper proof of
notice had been exhibited was conclusive, and the question
could not be inquired into by the Court. In Chalfant v. Edwards(3
it was admitted that no proper notice was given and the law
was declared invalid for that reason.
"It thus appears that while failure to give notice, if
admitted on the record, will invalidate the lav;, yet when
there is no such admission and the law is properly certified,
the presumption is conclusive- that due notice was given and
the Court will not inquire into it." ( 4.)
1. Stockton v. Powell-1892- 29 .la. 1. See also - Brodnax v.
Groom 64 H. c. 244; Waterman v. Hawkins 75 Ark 120; Whited v.
Lewis 25 La. 568; St. Louis & S.W. R.R. v. State ( Ark. 1911 )
134 S.W. 970.
2. 156 Pa. 554- 1893; 3. 173 Pa. 246.
4. White Commentaries on Const. Pa. pp. 265 - 264.

The attitude assumed by the Pennsylvania Court seems to "be
more reasonable than that of the weight of authority. In most
states no matter how flagrantly the provision requiring pub-
lication of notice has been violated, the courts hold that
the presumption that the legislature has acted within the
constitutional provision is conclusive. The object of the pro-
vision requiring notice of intention to apply for a special
act, by publication in the locality to be affected, was to
arouse public opinion in order that the bill might be attacked
if it were vicious^ and the legislature induced to defeat it.
If, however, the legislature may openly disregard the provision
requiring publication, this safe-guard is of no value. The
passage of the bill ought be no more than a strong presumption
that the lav/ requiring publication has been complied with, a
presumption that may be over-turned if the record shows that
notice was not given or that the law has been violated.
In Missouri the question as to whether or not the legis-
lature has complied with the provision requiring notice of
intention to apply for a special or local act, has, in a not
clearly defined case, been held subject to judicial review. ( 1. )
It was held that it was for the court to determine finally
whether or not the provision had been complied with, and that
the provision was mandatory upon the legislature. Why the pro-
vision is mandatory and if so why it is the function of the
1. State ex. rel. v. Yancy 123 Mo. 391.

Court to substitute their discretion for that of the legis-
lature docs not appear in the decision. Perhaps this attitude
was taken for the reason that the Constitution of Missouri
grants to the courts the power of reviewing a legislative act
when such is special or local in character and it would appear
that a general la?; might have been i.iade applicable.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GRANTING TO THE COURTS THE POWER
OP DETERMINING FINALLY WHETHER OR NOT A GENERAL LAW COULD
HAVE BEEN MADE APPLICABLE.
The clause providing "that in all other cases no special <xA
shall be passed where a general lav/ can be made applicable",
interpreted by the courts as leaving the question of whether
or not the necessity for a special act existed, entirely to
the legislature, evidently did not work out satisfactorily
in some states. In Missouri this provision had been in effect
but ten years when it was radically ehanged by a constitutional
amendment providing that whether or not a general law could
have been made applicable was a question for the courts to de-
termine, without regard to any legislative assertion on the
subject. ( 1. ) Since 1875 when the Convention of Missouri
adopted this provision, similar clauses have been adopted
1. Missouri- 1875- 1V-53. See Com'rs. v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247.

in Minnesota, Alabama, Kansas and Michigan. ( 1. )
Even this provision is not designed to abolish all special
and local legislation. Constitutional conventions usually re-
cognize the necessity for some local and special laws and have
only prohibited them in cases where a general law would have
provided the remedy sought in the unenumerated cases. This
provision only intends that the discretion of the legislature
in determining the necessity for a special act shall be sub-
ject to judicial review; that if in the opinion of the court
the result or remedy desired could have been secured under a
general scheme of legislation, a special act to this end will
be void, in spite of any legislative assertion to the contrary.
Under the provision which prohibited simply a special law
where a general law might be made applicable, the courts or-
dinarily refused to interfere no matter how vicious this special
act might be. Thus a constitutional provision giving the courts
power of review over a legislative discretion formerly ab-
solute, may prove valuable in an emergency. Y/hen the Michi-
gan Constitutional Convention of 1907 was considering this
clause providing for judicial control, Mr. Campbell said:
"The object of this amendment is to prevent the legis-
1. Minn. Amend. 1892, IV-33. Kansas 1906, 11-17.
Michigan 1908, V-30.
Ala. 1901, IV-10 5 - provides that in all cases where a general
law has been made applicable no special act shall be passed,
and that the courts are to be the final judges as to whether
or not such special act was necessary.

lature either1 upon petition of a per centage of the electors,
or by action of themselves, declaring that a special law is
necessary; that a genera 1 act can not be passed covering the
subject. It is a provision found in the Constitution of Minnes-
ota and I think it is a good one. In other states it has been
found that the attempts to limit the action of the legislature
upon the passage of special legislation has been easily avoided;
cases are on record where the legislature wanting to pass an
act that applied to only one city in the state would pass an
act to apply to cities having a population, say of 25,000 and
not exceeding 25,100. Nov; it seems to me that if it is made a
judicial question, if the courts shall determine whether or not
a special law is necessary, such attempts to get around the
constitutional provision would be avoided. ( 1.)
Owing to the fact that this provision has been in oper-
ation in Michigan only a short time, it is necessary to inquire
into the experience of other states in order to determine what
effect it has had.
The Alabama Constitution provides merely that no special
lav: shall be passed where a general law has been made applic-
able, and that whether or not a general law has been made ap-
plicable is declared to be a judicial question. ( 2. ) This lim-
its the power of the courts to declare special or local laws,
not specifically prohibited, void
;
to a very small number of
cases. Nevertheless the courts of this state have had several
1. Michigan Constitutional Convention Debates. Vol. 1-462.
2. Const. 1901, IV-105.

cases under consideration in which they declared acts providing
for the refunding of the bonded indebtedness of certain par-
ticular localities void on the ground that a general law was
in existence which provided for the refunding of the bonaed
indebtedness of localities. ( 1.) In the first of these cases
the Court said: "It is apparent that the subject matter of the
two act*is substantially the same; and it is equally apparent
that the inhibition contained in the section of the Constitu-
tion quoted was violated by the enactment of the local or
special lav/ if, the insertion of such matters in special,
local, or private lav; would obviate the constitutional pro-
hibition, then the prohibition could be easily circumvented
a
and practically rendered nugatory." ( 1.)
In a later case the Court said: "If, therefore, the issue
of the bonds by St. Clair County was provided for by the gen-
eral law, approved February 26, 1903, the legislature was for-
bidden to pass the act approved September 26, 1903, and the
Courts and not the legislature, are to determine that question".
Leaving to the courts the power of determining finally
whether or not a general law could have been made applicable
seems to have had a wholesome effect in Kansas. This provision
has been treated by the Kansas Courts as granting a definite
and specific power to the judicial department, and not a general
control over a wide field of legislation which they may attaoK
1. - la City of Montgomery v. Reese (1906) 149 Ala. 188.
lb. Forman v. Hair 150 Ala. 589
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and hold void under an extended interpretation of this pro-
vision when other means oi' holding the lav/ void have failed.
In a recent oase ( 1.) an act creating a separate Court for
the city of Canute was held void as being a local lav; where
a general act could have provided adequate remedy. Canute is
some distance from the county seat and being a city of about
15,000 people^ municipal court was thought both desirable
and necessary. The Court did not object to the City having
such a court but the act was nevertheless held void because a
general lav; offering like facilities to other cities similarly
circumstanced could have been made applicable to the situation.
This decision indicates the possibilities of reform. The courts
may by this check make it plain both to the legislatures and
the people that if localities desire additional machinery, the
proper method of obtaining it is to induce the legislature to
provide for it under a general legislative scheme, so that
may
other localities in a similar situationjiave the option of
accepting or rejecting the advantages offered them under such
a general act, as they may see fit. ( 2.)
The Court in Kansas has put a rather strict construction
upon this provision, yet a construction elastic enough to
allow them to extend the constitutional provision to cases
well within the spirit of the king, of legislation the provision
intended to check. In 1911 the Court applied this provision
1. State v. Nation 78 Kan. 394.
2. See also;- Gardner v. State 95 Pac. 588
Deng v. Lamb 95 Pac. 592 ; Stephens v. Com'rs. 98 Pac. 790.

to a somewhat unusual state of facto. A statute of 1809 pro-
vided that probate judges divide with the county all the fees
they collected in excess of -",000 p year. In 1901 the legis-
lature passed a special law relating to Wyandotte County,
which too:-; the probate judge of this County out of the oper-
ation of the general law of 1899. This law v/as passed at the
time when, under the interpretation of the constitutional
provision then in force, the legislature was the conclusive
judge of the applicability of a general law. In 1909 the legis-
lature passed another act which repealed the special law of
1901 and put Wyandotte under the operation of the general law
of 1899. Under this state of facts, the state, on the relation
of the Attorney General, petitioned for a mandamus against
Prather the Probate Judge of Wyandotte County, requiring him
to make a report of the fees collected by him as such probate
judge. Prather claimed that the act of 1909, repealing the
special law of 1901 was a special lav/ where a general law
could have been made applicable. The Court said:
" A more serious question is whether the act of 1909
violates the constitutional provision forbidding the enactment
off a special lav/ where a general one can be made applicable.
It is obviously in a sense special legislation relating to a
subject capable of regulation by a general law. But it v/as en-
acted under peculiar oircumstanoes. There v/as in force at the
time a general statute regulating the compensation of county
officers according to population, and a few special statute*
taking particular counties out of the rule so established.

These special stautos were valid "because they were passed
while the Legislature had the power to determine finally
whether a general law could be made applicable to the subject- a
power that was transferred to the courts in 1906 by constit-
utional amendment. The new act was not within the reason or
spirit of the rule against special legislation. The mischief
against which the prohibition is directed had already "been
done. The special acts had already been passed. Several coun-
ties had already been taken out of the general rule. The
latter enactment tended to remedy the existing evil, to reduce
the number of counties governed "by special acts, to take
V/yandotte County out of the list of exceptional cases, and
subject it to the operation of the general law. " ( 1.)
It might be suggested that the Court in this case could
have properly found the act special on the ground that the
act repealing the special law of 1901 should have placed all
counties under the operation of the general law of 1399, rather
than v/yandotte County alone. Though correct in theory this
objection is somewhat factitious in this case. Under the [facts
the attitude of the Court was at least in accord with public
policy, if not within the most strict construction of the
Constitutional provision. It seems perfectly consistent with
1. State v. Prather 112 Pac. 829; 84 Kan. 169 ( 1911)
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the spirit of the Kansas amendment of 1906, for the Court to
take the attitude that they will look with favor upon special
acts^that were passed "before the amendment was adopted, pro-
vided such special acts shall tena to place localities under
general laws.
Though the Missouri courts have not confined their in-
terpretation of this provision entirely to the kind of legis-
lation it was intended to prevent, yet like the Kansas courts
they have in clear cases of local and special legislation
declared legislative acts void, and by proper use of the pro-
vision made way for reform. In a leading case an act providing
that in all cities which now have or may have, a population of
300,000 or more, the judge of probate shall receive such com-
pensation as is now or may hereafter be provided by law to
be paid to Judges of the circuit courts in such cities, out of
the city treasury, was attacked as being a special act where
a general act could have been made applicable. The Court said:
"In this case could a general law have been iuade applicable?
The Constitution makes the determination of this question a
Judicial one. But counsel for defendant city admit that a gen-
eral law could have been made applicable. The admission,
however, is wholly superfluous since it is very plain that such
a law could have been made applicable, and the very best evi-
dence of this fact is furnished by the general law already
quoted, which gtood on our statute books for twenty years, re-
lating to every probate Judge in the state. This court has
constantly upheld the prohibition of the Constitution now

under consideration and has condemned as local or special
all legislation where a general lav; could have be. n made ap-
plicable. But the assertion is made that cases have been de-
cided by this Court where local or special legislation, that
is to say, legislation applicable alone to the City of St.
Louis or to Kansas City, has been held valid. There are
cases where this Court has said an act would have been valid
applied to St. Louis by name ; but this Court has never said
this of an act where a general lav/ could have been made ap-
plicable, but only in cases where it could not. A local or
special law can be passed by the legislature, but this can not
be done if the same object can be attained by a general law;
and as to whether this can be done is always 3 judicial question,
in investigating which legislative assertion goes for nothing.
In other words, and stating the point more briefly the power
to enact a local or special law is altogether exceptional
ana conditional; if the condition exists, to-v/it, the in-
ability to make a general lav/ applicable, then the power exits
to enact a local or special lav/. The condition is the basis
of the power; absent the condition absent the power". ( 1.)
.
as to
Although the actual facts of this case, particularly why
the legislature passed the act raising the probate judges
salary, do*B not appear, the case may be used to illustrate
how the constitutional provision giving to the courts the power
of finally determining whether or not a general law could
have been made applicable, may prevent a certain Kind of abuse.
1. Henderson v. Koenig 163 Mo. 366 ( 1902 )
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In case the majority of the State Legislature is under the
control of a political machine, this provision will give the
courts the power to step in and prevent special acts from
having legal effect when such acts undertake to provide ofi ices
for the more energetic partisans in the larger urban oomi un-
ities, fixing the salaries for such offices considerably higher
than is provided by the general lav/s of the state.
Unfortunately the courts in states where the constitut-
ions have made the question of determining whether or not a
general law would be applicable, a judicial one, have shown
a marked tendency to extend this provision to cover cases in
which a statute can not well be held invalid under the "due
process" or "equal protection of the laws" clauses. Under
such circumstances the courts in these states have frequently
held acts void as special laws where general laws might be
made applicable. It seems that in these cases the courts do
not consider themselves justified in holding the act void
as depriving some person of the equal protection of the laws,
so on the ground that the law does not apply to everyone, but
only to large classes of individuals, it is held void as
being special or local in character.
The extension of this discretion arises from a fund-
amental question of definition: "What is a special law?" In a
sense practically all legislation is special in that it is
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designed to correct come particular evil or special abuse and
in that it affects specially only those who may. "because of the
desire on the part of the legislature to correct this abuse,
come under its operation. The framers of our state constitutions
however, did not use the term "Special Legislation" in this
broad sense, but in a narrower sense in opposition to the term
"General or Public Act". In other words the term special legis-
lation means private acts applicable to only one individual
or to a few persons in a large class of individuals. BlacKstone
says that, "A general or public act is a universal rule affect-
ing the entire community or class of the community covered by
it. Thus to show the distinction, the statute 13 Eliz. ch.10,
to prevent spiritual persons from making leases for longer
terms than twenty one years, or their lives, is a public act,
being a rule prescribed to the whole body of spiritual persons
in the nation; but an act to enable the Bishop of Chester to
make a lease to A.B. for sixty years is an exception to this
rule; it concerns only the parties and the Bishops successors,
and is. therefore a private act." ( 1.)
When the various states adopted constitutional provisions
prohibiting local and special legislation, the purpose was to
check a very definite evil. In Illinois for example, the Legis-
lature passed in 1869 four large volumes of private and local
nearly
bills, coverin an infinite variety of subjects^.ll capable
of being regulated by general laws. A few examples of these
local and private o.cts are: An Act to Incorporate the Illinois
1. BlacKstone Commentaries pp. 85 and 86.
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Conference Preacher's Aid Society; ( 1.) An Act to change the
name of Georgie ( her other name being unknown ) to Clara
Alma Pitch; and make her the heir-at-law of Thomas D. Pitch
and Harriet V/. Pitch; ( 2. ) An act to prohibit gambling and
the sale of Bpirituo^ liquors within certain boundaries ad-
jacent to Blackburn University, providing fine and imprison-
ment for a violation of said act; ( 3.) An Act to authorize
George Carpenter to raise his mill dam across the Sangamon
River. ( 4.)
These examples taken from the private acts of the Illinois
Legislature for the year 1869 clearly show the nature of the
evil which the Constitutional Convention of that State in 1870
wished to prohibit. The prohibitions on local and special
legislation were not intended to be extended so as to supple-
ment the guaranties of the clause assuring all persons the
equal protection of the laws. The protection afforded by that
clause is, at present at least, sufficient to safeguard pri-
vate rights. The constitutional conventions in the several
states did not intend that the limitations upon local and
special legislation should operate so as to prevent the legis-
latures from passing police measures founded upon a reason-
able basis of classification.
Through a loose use on the part of the courts of the
term, "Special legislation" the original meaning of it has
Illinois Private Acts 1869. (1.) Vol. I. p. 246, 2. Vol. II
3. VolII p. 911, 4. Vol. IV. p. 498.

"becoine obscured in many jurisdictions. Because of judicial
dicta and loose definitions of the term, it is possible to
find color of authority for holding wt^m void as special
legislation acts which, if objectionable at all should have
been attacked under the "equal protection of the laws" clause.
This extension of the meaning of the term special legislation
to cover a vast field of legislation is naturally most notice-
able in those states which have the constitutional provision
granting to the courts the pov;er of determining finally whether
or not a general law could have been made applicable in a
given case. Yet this extension has not been confined to these
the
states entirely. Althon ;ii Illinois Constitution does not pro-
vide for judicial control in such cases, there are several
decisions in this State which indicate the danger of a broad
interpretation of the prohibitions against special and local
legislation. In a recent case ( 1. ) the Court held a st a L»ut
e
providing wash-rooms for mines, void, as :-ot being a valid
exercise of the State's police power. Furthermore the Court
said: "We conclude that the enactment here in question
is obnoxious to that provision of the fundamental law of the
State which forbids special legislation in certain enumerated
cases." Curiously enough, the Court failed to indicate the
specific prohibition which would cover the case in question.
In fact none of the specific prohibitions against local and
1. Starne v. People 222 111. 189 ( 1906)
See also: Braceville coal Co. v. People 147 111. 6G (1893)
Jossma v. Foundry Co. £49 111. 508.

special legislation oan possibly "be oonstued in a v/ay to jus-
tify holding the police measure in question, void.
A Missouri case illustrates the "broad extension of this
provision as supplementary to the equal protection of the laws
clause. The defendant was fined for a violation of an act which
made it a misdemeanor to carry on the "business of "barber on
Sunday. The Court held that the act violated the provision
which forbade special legislation where a general law could
have been made applicable. The Court said:
"The fact that laboring on Sunday may be prohibited by
proper legislation, as a police regulation, does not place the
act beyond or without the inhibition of the Constitution. If
the act is valid, then why may not the legislature by one act
prohibit the farmer, by another a blacksmith and so on until
all Kinds of labor on that day are prohibited? Clearly this
may be done by a general lav/ embracing all Kinds of latoor.
The object of the Constitution is manifest. It was to prohibit
special and local legislation and to substitute general laws
in place of it, wherever by a general law the same ends could
be accomplished." ( 1.)
In this case it appears that the classification of the
legislature was reasonable. The defendant was not singled out
and deprived of the equal protection of the laws. The act
applied equally to all barbers and it seems as though the
1. State v. Granneman 132 Mo. 326.
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Court in this case seized upon the clause limiting special
legislation and giving them the power of determining whether
or not a general lav/ could have "been made applicable, as a
subterfuge.
The tendency on the part of the courts to extend this
provision giving them the power of determining v/hether or not
a general law could have been made applicable, thus bringing
a large field of legislation within their power of declaring
laws void, has been a fruitful source of most confusing liti-
gation in Minnesota. In this state it seems as though the
Courts have had little idea Just what the provision intends
and just what powers it vests in them. In an early case ( 1.)
under this clause
;
the defendant was imprisoned for violating
a statute which provided that peddlers and hawkers must be
licensed. The act exempted, however, from its operation, manu-
facturers, mechanics, farmers, butchers and nurserymen. This
statute was held void as a special law where a general lav/
could be made applicable. Justice Mitchell dissenting, attempted
to correct the misapprehension oi the Court in regard to the
scope of this provision against special legislation.
"While I concur in the result," he said, "I do not v/ish
to place the decision of the case exclusively upon section 33
Article IV of the Constitution. I am of the opinion that even
if these sections had never been adopted, the act in question
1. State ex rel. Luria v. Wagener, 69 Minn. 206
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would Have been invalid as olaaa legislation "because repugnant
to section 2, Article I of the Constitution, which declares
that, 1 No member oi' the state shall "be deprived of any of
the rights or privileges secured to any other citizen thereof
unless by the law of the land 1 .
"
Yet even this dissent is not sufficiently vigorous to
indicate clearly the danger of interpreting too broadly this
provision prohibiting special and local laws where a general
act could have been Liade applicable and giving to the courts
the power of finally determining whether or not the special
act was necessary.
In a subsequent Cii.se a statute forbidding the sale of
liquor to any Indian, regardless of his status, was attached.
Justice Mitchell delivering the opinion of the Court, held
that this statute was a valid exercise of the State' s police
power and not contrary to the claus.e of the Constitution which
prohibited a special lav/ where a general lav/ could be made
applicable. ( 1.
)
Certainly the clause prohibiting a special law where a
general law could have been made applicable v/as not violated
by this act. There was neither reason no* necessity for con-
sidering the sta^ite in question in the light of this clause.
This case presented a golden opportunity
-for the Court £es
to declare once and for all that the clause prohibiting special
1. State v. wise ( 1897) 70 Minn. 99.

and local legislation was not intended to "be extended so as
to supplement the wequal protection of the laws" clause. The
Court could nave quite properly indicated that if the statute
was not objectionable on the ground that it denied some one
the equal protection of the laws, the prohibitions against
local and special legislation could not and would not be con-
stued so as to hold void police measures founded upon a reas-
onable basis of classification.
The precedent established by these earlier cases is such
that it is now customary for counsel seeking to overthrow a
Minnesota statute, to claim that it is a special law where a
general law could have been made applicable, when the objection,
if well taken ^/ould be that the statute deprives the defendant
of the equal protection of the laws. ( £. )
1. In State ex. rel. Chapel v. Justus ( 1903 ) 90 Minn. 477
an act requiring journeymen plumbers to take an examination and
procure a certificate of competency, if they were working in
cities of 10,000 or more, having a system of waterworks, was
held to be a special law where a general lav; could have been
made applicable, because it distinguished between journeymen
and master plumbers.
In State ex. rel. Hoffman v. Justus 91 Minn. 447 an act of
1903 prohibiting the keeping open of butcher shops and other
business places on Sunday, while it authorized the sale of
confectionary and tobacco was held not a special law where a
general lav; could have been made applicable.
See also: State v. sherod 80 Minn. 446.

CONCLUSION.
This clause giving the courts the power to determine fin-
ally whether or not a general law could have been made applio-
able
;
wfc*fe strictly constjied has and will no doubt continue to
check a type of legislation long since considered undesirable
if not actually vicious. The clause which provided simply ,that
the legislature should pass no local or special law where a
general law could be made applicable
(
did not adequately check
a considerable field of special legislation for the reason
that the courts interpreted this provision as leaving the
question of the necessity for a special lav/ entirely to the
discretion and conscience of the legislature. Very frequently
the legislatuim by abusing this final discretion or
r
ignoring
the voice of conscience passed an act clearly special or local
in character, ^which the courts would not hold void. It is
under these conditions that a clause providing for judicial
control might well become a valuable safeguard to the public.
The power of the courts to determine whether or not a
special law is necessary has been and may well continue to be
used to further the aim and intention of the section of enum-
erated provisions by directing legislation into a uniform
channel. The power of the courts to review the action of the
legislature in the unenumerated as well as the specific pro-
hibitions will tend to force the legislature to pass acts
applicable to all localities upon a reasonable ban is of class-
ification. If a certain locality wishes some additional mach-
inery for local administration, it is proper for the legis-
lature to pass an act which will not only assure such machinery
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to this locality "but to all other localities in the state
having similar local conditions, by making it optional with
such localities to accept the provisions of the law or reject
them at their pleasure. A tendency of this sort will direct
legislation into a broader field of general policy, rather
than allow too much time to be wasted over the intricate de-
tails arising from the varying needs of each locality. ( l.)
The chief difficulty with the clause providing that the
courts .".hall determine finally whether or not a general lav;
could have been made applicable has been that the courts fail
to confine the application, of this provision to the type
of legislation it was intended to prevent. This clause v/as
not intended to supplement the safeguard which guarantees
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, and that no person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws. To hold a police measure
void, when it is founded upon a reasonable classification and
can not be- said to be objectionable as denying any person the
equal protection of the laws, on the ground that such measure
is special and local in character because it does not apply
to everyone and is therefore a special lav/ where a general
one could have been made applicable, is too broad an interpre-
tation of a very definite grant of power.
1. Some states have,by provisions for constitutional
home rule for cities, secured a parallel remedy in addition to
the remedies which restrictions upon local and special legis-
lation have attempted to provide
.

The provisions in the Michigan Constitution of 1908 seem
to "be the final word in restrictions upon local and special
legislation. These provisions appear to anticipate all the
difficulties which have arisen in other state5over clauses
prohibiting special legislation -and .to provide localities with
a great anaount of independence in the control of their gov-
ernmental machinery as well. Ho difficulties have yet arisen
either because the provision is too elastic or too rigid, and
in comparison with the experience of other states the aimount
of litigation liKely to arise is very slight indeed.
In the Michigan Constitution the number of cases in which
special or local legislation is prohibited is only five
mimber, ( 1. ) a marked contrast to the Alabama Constitution
which prohibits local and special legislation in thirty three
specific cases.- The tendency of this small number of specific
prohibition is primarily to give great freedom of legislative
action. Yet lest this great fret do::, of action be abused, there
is a counter provision prohibiting special or local laws in
all cases where a general lav/ could have been made applicable,
and it is the province of the courts to determine finally
whether or not a general lav/ could have been made applicable. (
An additional safeguard is secured by a provision which re-
quires that, "Ho local or special act shall take effect until
approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon in the
1. Mich. Const. 190S V- 31 to 35.
2. »" " V - 30
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district to be affooted. • ( 1.) Under these safeguards even
a "beneficial and proper local or special measure has a long
and hard road to travel "before it finally can become a lav/.
If the legislature passes a vicious local or special measure,
the people in the locality to "be affected ,if the act "becomes
a lav;, have an opportunity to defeat it at the polls when it is
submitted for their approval. If by any chance the undesirable
features of such an act would not become evident until after
the people in the locality had accepted it and it had been
in actual operation for a time, injured parties would still
have an opportunity to attack the act in court as a special
lav; where a general law could have been made applicable. Under
such circumstances it might prove very valuable to the public
to have a constitutional provision granting to the courts of
the state the power of determining ultimately whether or not
a general law could have been made applicable.
On the other hand the clause which gives the courts this
power of review is not so lively to be abused or even used
except in emergencies, without doubt the courts will be very
careful about declaring an act void after the majority of
the electors in the locality to be affected have made known
their willingness to be under its operation. ( 1.)
The local referrendum on special and local acts provided
o
by the Michigan Constitution is undoubtedly a much more pwer-
ful means of arousing public opinion than the provision in

Other state constitutions which require the publication of no-
tice of intention to apply for a local or special act. It
seems eminently more just that the people to "be affected "by
a local or special act shall have the opportunity not only of
speaking against it but also of voting against it and defeating
it, if they desire to do so. In the final analysis of the
problem it seems very desirable to place the responsibility
for the defects as well as for the beneficial results of a
local or special act upon the people who are to be affected by
it.



